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A series of five experiments were conducted to explore whether Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz’s (1998) Implicit Association Test (IAT), which purportedly measures 
implicit affective evaluations, could be modified to differentiate between honest and 
deceptive responding to forced-choice questioning.  Experiments 1 and 2 
demonstrated that a dual-discrimination task can in fact be useful in deception 
detection but that the relative reaction time differences run opposite in direction from 
those expected from the typical IAT bias pattern.  Subsequent experiments assessed 
the procedure’s susceptibility to simple countermeasures (Experiment 4) and tested 
variations to its trial sequence (Experiment 3) and stimulus presentation (Experiment 
5).  Neither of the two procedure variants was successful in producing above-chance 
predictions and instructions to delay reactions times to a constant latency sufficiently 
undermined the original procedure’s efficacy.  The applied limitations 
notwithstanding, the present research extends the relevance of dual-discrimination 
methodologies and supports the idea that biographical information is cognitively 
represented such that what is known to be true or false is implicitly associated with 
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One of the more contentious debates in the social-cognitive literature concerns the 
reliability, validity, and applicability of procedures designed to measure attitudes 
implicitly, most notably Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz’s (1998) Implicit 
Association Test (IAT).  The IAT consists of a computer-based reaction time task on 
which participants make rapid categorizations of stimuli as they appear on the screen.  
Central to the debate is the extent to which differences in response latencies can be 
interpreted as a measure of some concrete, independent entity separate from one’s 
explicit attitude (e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).  Nonetheless, the apparent ability of 
the IAT to reliably predict some meaningful differences (Greewald, Nosek, & Banaji, 
2003; Lambert, Payne, Ramsey, & Shaffer, 2005) suggests that it is, at the very least, 
measuring the influence of cognitive associations between target stimuli and 
evaluative words in its dual-discrimination task. 
 
Deception, by definition, is the “deliberate attempt… to create in another a belief 
which the communicator considers to be untrue” (Vrij, 2000, p.6).  It should not be 
surprising that psychologists have taken considerable interest in deception, especially 
given the potentially negative interpersonal consequences of being deceived.  Early 
research attempted to identify the individual characteristics of children that lie, and 
instead found that the decision to deceive is determined more by the social situation 
than personality (Hartshorne & May, 1928).  Nonetheless there have been many 
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attempts to develop questionnaires that measure integrity, though such measures 
appear to have little predictive validity (Goldberg, Grenier, Guion, Sechrest & Wing, 
1991).  Deception, especially in the context of psychological research, can often take 
the form of socially desirable responses (Rosenberg, 1965) and self-serving 
inferences (Johnson, Feigenbaum, & Weisbeg, 1964).  As such, psychologists have 
developed strategies for circumventing deception, including the use of behavioral and 
“behavioroid” (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1969) measures, projective (e.g., Morgan & 
Murray’s Thematic Apperception Test) and implicit measures (e.g., Greenwald et al., 
1998), and by establishing the pretense that deception will be detected and is 
therefore futile (Jones & Sigall, 1971).  The majority of psychological research has 
focused on detecting deception, giving a great deal of attention to non-verbal 
behavior (e.g., DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Ekman, O’Sullivan & Frank, 1999; 
Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2004) and physiological arousal (e.g., Larson, 1932; Lykken, 
1981; Iacono & Patrick, 1997; Raskin & Honts, 2002).  Others have looked for 
indications of deception using electroencephalography (Bull et al., 2004), functional 
brain imaging (e.g., Kozel, Padgett, & George, 2004), linguistic content analysis (see 
Mermon, Vrij, & Bull, 2003), and voice stress analysis (Gunn & Gudjonsson, 1988) 
with limited success (National Research Council, 2003).   
 
Regardless of whether the deception takes the form of falsification, concealment, or 
equivocation (Burgoon et al., 1994), in order to deceive one must cognitively 
represent both the actual state of affairs (the truth) and the state he or she wishes to 
project to a naïve other (the lie).  Assuming that the matter of interest can objectively 
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be considered either true or false (e.g., you either have or have not, knowingly, used 
an illegal drug at least once in your life), then a dishonest response must be associated 
with one’s concept of a lie.  If responses to forced-choice questioning (i.e., “yes” or 
“no”) are cognitively represented as either being true or untrue then it may be 
possible to detect associations between those responses and their veracity (i.e., “truth” 
or “lie”) much in the way that the IAT detects associations between target groups of 
interest and evaluatively positive or negative adjectives.  The development of an 
implicit deception detector stands to offer both theoretical and methodological 
contributions to the existing body of implicit measurement literature and an applied 
contribution to psychological science of deception detection. 
 
The present research examined whether an IAT-like procedure can effectively 
measure the association between one’s response to questions regarding a specific 
behavior and the categorical concepts of “truth” and “lie.”  A series of five studies 
was conducted to test experimentally the usefulness of such a procedure for 
differentiating between honest and deceptive responses to focused questioning.  
Experiments 1 and 2 explored the predictive potential of the implicit procedure on 
participants randomly assigned to honestly or dishonestly confess or deny having 
engaged in some illegal activity.  The third experiment assessed a variant of the 
procedure in which screen configurations were randomized on a per-trial basis rather 
than the customary (Greenwald et al., 1998; 2003) per-block configuration.  If equally 
effective this variant would make it considerably more difficult to delay strategically 
specific responses as a function of question type and screen configurations in an 
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attempt to avoid detection.  Experiment 4 explored whether the procedure is easily 
countermeasured with a deliberate attempt to avoid detection by altering one’s 
response profile.  Lastly, Experiment 5 tested another variant of the procedure in 
which the target stimuli were simplified to single words (rather than entire sentences).  
The purpose of this study was to explore the possibility of reducing overall variability 




Methodological, Theoretical, & Applied Contributions 
 
The contribution of this project is largely methodological in that it expands the 
parameters of both the social-cognitive and deception detection literature.  
Specifically it extends the relevance of implicit association procedures to include not 
only evaluative association but to beliefs about factual statements.  Within the context 
of deception detection, above-chance predictions based on response latencies suggest 
that episodic information, both actual and fictional, is respectively linked to our 
cognitive representations of “the truth” and “our lies.”  In an extensive review of the 
literature Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2007) insist that the IAT was never intended 
as a lie detector and cite the lack of any evidence for such an application.  That is, 
whereas the IAT was intended to be a measure free of the social desirability and self-
serving biases that plague explicit attitude measures (Clark & Tifft, 1966; Jones & 
Sigall, 1971; Paulhaus, 1984) Nosek et al. (2007) caution that discrepancies between 
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implicit and explicit measures cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence of 
deception on the latter.  It is more likely, given their conceptualization of implicit 
attitudes, that individuals may simply be unaware of their ambivalence towards the 
target attitude object.  Nonetheless many have argued that such a discrepancy is 
evidence that individuals are attempting to conceal socially undesirable attitudes and, 
in effect, lie about their true feelings (see Fazio & Olson, 2003).  Such debate 
notwithstanding, the IAT’s application to objectively true or false responses has yet to 
be explored, nor has any theory been advanced regarding the cognitive process by 
which such a procedure might work. 
 
One important characteristic of such a cognitive process is that it should not, in 
theory, be confounded with the fear of detection.  Currently the most widely used 
method is a psycho-physiological detection (PPD) procedure (i.e., the polygraph) 
which is regularly used to estimate the veracity of statements, detect breaches of 
national security, and even to measure a sex offender’s intention to re-offend (Honts, 
2004).  Though the literature is plagued with contradictory findings and the 
methodologies used in deception detection research are often suspect, a meta-analysis 
of reputable experiments conducted by the National Academy of Science estimated 
the polygraph’s reliability to be around 86% (National Research Council, 2003).  The 
theoretical explanation for PPD’s success rests on its ability to measure small changes 
in physiological arousal following responses to target questions and accusations of 
deceit.  Consistent activation of the autonomic nervous system following relevant 
stimuli (as compared to baseline levels following control questions) suggests a fear 
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response, presumably the fear of being detected (Bull et al., 2004).  Thus, much like 
the Bogus Pipeline procedure (Jones & Sigall, 1971), PPD relies both on the belief 
that the procedure is effective and on the fear of being discovered (Saxe, 1991).  In 
fact, Saxe, Schmitz, and Zaichkowsky (1985, as cited in Saxe, 1991) demonstrated 
that deceptive participants who were given strong reason to doubt the effectiveness of 
a polygraph went undetected.   
 
Similar to other contemporary approaches using facial cues (for an extensive review 
see Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005) or an fMRI to detect neurological activity associated 
with familiarity (e.g., to crime scene photographs) or deception (e.g., Rosenfeld, 
Soskins, Bosh, & Ryan, 2004; Kozel et al., 2004), the present technique does not 
require faith in the procedure nor concern over its outcome.  The activation of 
implicit associations in memory is an automatic and uncontrollable cognitive process 
(Bargh, 1992; Greenwald et al., 1998) and, in the case of deception, is fundamentally 
necessary to the act itself.  That is, one cannot offer a deceptive response, whether 
spontaneously or with premeditation, without cognitively processing information that 
is implicitly categorized as untrue and therefore activating the concept “lying.”  Thus, 
detecting deception via the measurement of implicit associations may be less 
constrained than the classic PPD approaches with regards to the fear of detection.  
 
An additional advantage to a cognitive approach to deception detection is the relative 
ease with which the procedure can be designed and deployed.  The alternative 
psycho-physiological methodologies are cumbersome in that they require specialized 
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equipment and extensively trained administrators.  An implicit measurement 
procedure, on the other hand, can be run on any computer, can be completed in 20 
minutes, and is highly cost-effective.  Any new development in the detection field 
may be a useful in a wide variety of contexts (Gass & Seiter, 2007) as either an 
alternative when existing procedures are not logistically feasible or as a source of 
supplemental data to decrease the likelihood of incorrect conclusions. 
 
 
Cognitive Deception Detection 
 
There is a small body of literature that has attempted to detect deception via reaction 
times based on the premise that lying requires more cognitive effort than telling the 
truth.  There is some support for the prediction that dishonest responses take longer to 
put forward (e.g., Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003), but other studies 
have yielded inconsistent or contradictory results (e.g., Hsu, Santelli, & Hsu, 1989).  
Gregg (2007), in what is perhaps the most conceptually similar study to the present 
experiments, had participants categorize stimuli as either true or false.  Those 
statements included factual and inaccurate statements about the world (e.g., “Grass is 
green” or “Grass is blue”) and about the participant (e.g., “I am a male” or “I am a 
female”).  After completing a block of trials in which the two categories of statements 
were intermixed, participants were then instructed to complete a block in which they 
accurately categorized worldly statements but dishonestly categorized personal ones.  
Consistent with Gregg’s (2007) predictions, latencies were longer when participants 
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were forced to respond dishonestly to questions about their first name, age, gender, 
address, birthplace, marital status, citizenship, and diet. 
 
Two important limitations to Gregg’s (2007) study are relevant to the present 
proposal.  First, participants were not attempting to conceal information about 
themselves with the goal of being believed, but rather were following instructions to 
categorize incorrectly statements that had already been established as true or false.  
That is, the participants were fully aware that the answers they were providing in later 
blocks of trials were already known to be false by virtue of the instructions given.  As 
no meaningful lie was involved in the procedure it is difficult to conclude that 
Gregg’s (2007) methodology is appropriate for field applications of deception 
detection.  Second, the latency averages computed for the two critical blocks of 
testing were aggregates across the entire set of statements.  The procedure was useful 
in detecting an overall delay when participants were required to provide counter-
factual responses to a wide range of statements but was not designed to verify the 
veracity of any one of those statements.  The present procedure, on the other hand, 
was designed to question participants about a single, specific behavior (e.g., illegal 
drug use, illegal file downloading, etc.) that they may or may not be attempting to 
conceal.   
 
Of course the applied contribution of any deception detection procedure hinges on its 
ability to distinguish successfully honest and dishonest responses when participants 
are informed of specific strategies for altering their response profiles.  One such 
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strategy or avoiding detection would be to delay all responses to a constant integer 
within the required response window such that there are no detectable differences in 
one’s latency profile.  A more sophisticated approach would be to delay selectively 
responses on specific trials to produce the pattern indicative of truthful responding.  
Given that existing research on the malleability of the IAT has demonstrated it is 
quite difficult to control one’s response profile in the desired directions without both 
explicit instructions on how to do so and extensive practice (see Steffens, 2004 for a 
recent review), it is reasonable to expect the same would hold true for the present 
application of the procedure.  Further, as long as instructions alone are insufficient to 
negate the procedure, its practical value as a deception detection system would be 
equal to that of existing PPD procedures, all of which are similarly vulnerable to 














The purpose of Experiment 1 was to test whether response profiles from an IAT-like 
procedure can be used to predict whether a participant’s biographical claim is 





Participants first completed a questionnaire asking them to report, among other 
things, whether they had ever used an illegal drug. The matter of one’s drug history 
was chosen because pilot testing indicated that roughly 50% of students have used an 
illegal substance at least once while 50% have not.  We can be reasonably certain that 
the information provided on the initial survey was accurate because it was explicitly 
explained that all data would be tracked only by a random subject number not in any 
way associated with their identities.  Further, participants were asked to complete the 
anonymous survey privately, seal it in an envelope themselves, and place it in a 
sealed box to be opened only after the study was complete.  Given the extent to which 
their anonymity was protected there is no reason to suspect that any substantial 





Fully aware that the purpose of the study is to evaluate a new lie detection technique, 
participants were then randomly assigned either to confess or deny illegal drug use 
upon any further questioning by the researcher.  By doing so the participants were, in 
effect, assigned to respond honestly or dishonestly without the researcher being aware 
of their condition.  This helped create the desired impact in that only the participant 
was aware of whether he or she was lying or telling the truth.  Additionally, the 
participants’ actual drug history was not confounded with whether they were asked to 
lie or tell the truth. 
 
Once they had been given instructions on how to respond participants were brought 
into a small testing room and orally questioned by the researcher about both their 
history with illegal drugs and control items to which we knew all participants are 
responding honestly (see Appendix A).  Participants were then told that their 
truthfulness would be determined by their performance on the computerized lie 
detection system, and that in order to earn a passing score they must respond as 
quickly and as accurately as possible on every trial. 
 
Because a reaction time task requires a certain level of persistent motivation on the 
part of the participant it was desirable that the computer task would be taken seriously 
as a lie detection system.  To that effect an effort was made to present the system as 
an official and legitimate detector.  The program (using PTS’s E-Prime & Adobe 
PhotoShop) greeted participants with an official-looking BRASS (Binary Response 
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Authentication Software System) logo and welcome screen.  Instructions were 
presented on the screen and read aloud by a pre-recorded voice to create the 
impression of a sophisticated, functional program. 
 
The procedure, much like the traditional IAT, was organized into training and testing 
blocks.  The first block of trials trained the discrimination task with target stimuli 
being Yes/No questions concerning whether they have used or abstained from using 
drugs, whether they are being honest or dishonest about their drug use, and whether 
they have drunk or abstained from drinking water.  The water questions, on which all 
participants were instructed to respond honestly, were intended as filler items to 
ensure that those responding dishonestly about their drug use were cognizant of the 
distinction between their honest and deceitful responses.   
 
Prior to and between trials the screen remained black with the response options, in 
white text, presented in the top-left and top-right corners.  A question appeared and 
remained on the screen until a response button was pressed or until the response 
latency exceeded a limit of 4000ms.  Response windows were established based on 
averages obtained in pilot testing to ensure that participants were motivated to 
respond quickly.  If the participant answered correctly within the 4000ms window the 
stimulus disappeared and was followed by a 1500ms inter-trial interval (ITI).  If the 
participant answered incorrectly, the text turned red and a red “X” appeared below the 
question for 1000ms before a 500ms ITI.  If participants failed to respond in time the 
trial was counted as an error, the text turned red and “Too Slow!” appeared below for 
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1000ms.  Regardless of whether the response was correct or incorrect, responses 
falling between 3000ms and 4000ms were followed by an additional prompt with the 
BRASS logo (1000ms) and “YOU MUST GO FASTER.” and the (500ms) ITI 
followed.  Within all blocks the sequence of trials was randomized for each 
participant (see Appendix B). 
 
The second block of trials trained a Truth/Lie discrimination task, in which quotations 
(in black text) appear in a light-grey stripe centered on the screen.  Participants were 
instructed to indicate whether the statement, if said to them by another person, would 
be the truth or a lie.  Truth/Lie statements were visually distinct in color to facilitate 
differentiating them from Yes/No questions in later dual-discrimination blocks 
(Nosek et al., 2007).  Again responses were followed by a speed prompt after 3000ms 
and counted as errors after 4000ms. 
 
The third block randomly intermixed Yes/No question trials with Truth/Lie 
discrimination trials and paired Yes and Lie response options on one button and No 
and Truth options on the other button.  Thus, participants were required to respond to 
half of the questions under truth-congruent conditions (their response used the same 
button as they would press for a truthful statement) and the other half under truth-
incongruent conditions.  The stimuli were presented as they were in the earlier blocks, 
although participants were now required to respond within 3000ms and speed prompts 
now followed latencies exceeding 2000ms.  Again trial sequences were randomized 




A fourth block of trials retrained the Truth/Lie discrimination task with the response 
options reversed.  The fifth and final block repeated the dual-categorization task so 
that questions that were answered under truth-congruent conditions were now 
answered under truth-incongruent conditions (and vice-versa).  After completing all 






As with any reaction time procedure, a rule for data inclusion was established a priori.  
Participants whose response accuracy fell below 80% were excluded because such a 
high error rate indicates either a lack of effort or an inability to complete the task 
proficiently, thus making it difficult to interpret the latencies on correct trials.  Of the 
173 male and female undergraduates that participated data from thirteen (7.5%) were 
discarded for failing to achieve the 80% accuracy rate across all 356 trials and across 
the 220 trials within the two test blocks.  The remaining 160 participants earned an 
average accuracy rate of 94%, and there was no difference in overall accuracy 
between those lying and those telling the truth.  
 
In line with expectations, 55% reported some history of illegal drug use on the initial 
survey while the remaining 45% denied any use.  By virtue of the instructions given 
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to participants each was categorized into one of four conditions: they either (1) 
honestly admitted drug use, (2) honestly denied drug use, (3) dishonestly admitted 
drug use, or (4) dishonestly denied drug use.  Assuming that the nature of an 
individual’s claim and the distribution of the sample are known (i.e., 81 of 160 are 
lying) there was a 50.6% chance of correctly guessing whether he or she was 
instructed to lie or tell the truth. 
 
Response latencies from the first block of practice trials in which participants 
responded to the Yes/No questions were subjected to an ANOVA to determine 
whether providing counter-factual responses led to greater overall response times.  
Contrary to what we might expect from studies that have found that lying takes longer 
to do (e.g., Gregg, 2007) there were no significant differences in the amount of time it 
took to respond to the drug-related questions among any of the four participant 
conditions, F(3,156) = .876, p > .05. 
 
Latencies from the two test blocks were converted to Z-scores based on each 
participant’s individual average and standard deviation within each of the test blocks 
respectively.  This effectively calibrates the analysis procedure for each participant’s 
natural baseline reaction time and removes the variability from between-subject 
comparisons (Fazio, 1990) on specific questions.  Further, transforming latencies by 
block ensures that the effect of any general practice or fatigue effects are accounted 
for.  This was particularly important with the present design because the block in 
which a specific question occurred as a truth-congruent trial differs as a function of 
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whether the individual was admitting or denying drug use.  For example, when asked 
about having used an illegal drug, someone denying use would have answered “no” in 
the first test block as a truth-incongruent trial and in the second test block as a truth-
congruent trial.  However, when asked about abstaining from drug use, “yes” would 
have appeared as a truth-congruent trial in the first test block and as a truth-
incongruent trial in the second.  The opposite was true for someone admitting to drug 
use as the configuration of response options did not vary between subjects. 
 
A participant’s response profile consisted of four averages, one for each of the four 
drug-related questions under truth-congruent and truth-incongruent conditions.  Much 
as in the traditional IAT, a difference score (Greenwald et al., 1998; 2003) for each of 
the four target questions was computed: 
 
 Difference (DQ1) = Truth-congruent (ZQ1) – Truth-incongruent (ZQ1) 
 
A difference score greater than zero indicates that an individual took longer than 
average to answer that question under the truth-congruent condition as compared to 
the truth-incongruent condition.  A negative score, on the other hand, indicates that 
the individual responded faster in the truth-congruent condition. 
 
The difference scores on the four drug-related questions were summed together to 
form a single dependent variable reflective of any overall response bias in truth-
congruent or –incongruent conditions.  As depicted in Figure 1, participants 
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Fig 1. Bias Scores From Exp 1 
responding honestly tended to exhibit a positive bias score (M = .188, SD = .712) 
while those responding dishonestly exhibited a negative bias score (M = -.147, SD = 
.687).  An ANOVA confirmed a main effect for response veracity, F(1,156) = 5.80, p < 
.05, and failed to detect either a main effect for the specific claim (used or abstained) 
or an interaction between the two, 
F(1,156) = .04 and F(1,156) = .21 
respectively, p’s > .05.  All four of 
the difference scores were greater for 
those responding honestly, though 
individual t-tests were only 
marginally significant.  A subsequent 
analysis failed to find any significant 
covariants among training block 
latency averages or accuracy rates. 
 
Average bias scores of the four participant conditions were collapsed into two groups, 
one for those who were responding honestly and the other for those who were 
responding dishonestly.  Using only the bias score a logistic regression correctly 
predicted response veracity 56.3% of the time, which is significantly greater than 







The 6% gain in prediction accuracy may not seem overwhelmingly impressive, but 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that a dual-discrimination procedure can successfully 
detect some cognitive bias for truth-congruent (or –incongruent) responding.  The 
positive bias score, typical of participants responding honestly, indicates more rapid 
reactions on truth-incongruent trials.  Conversely, those lying tended to respond faster 
on truth-congruent trials than on truth-incongruent trials (as indicated by the negative 
bias score).  It is important to note that this pattern was opposite from the general IAT 
finding that responses are facilitated by congruent (bias-consistent) response options.  
For example, on the typical IAT, someone categorizing images as animals or insects 
should be quick to press the “insect” button when that button is the same as that used 
to categorize valenced words as “bad” (e.g., “disease”).  When the response options 
are bias-incongruent, however, with “insect” and “bad” on opposing buttons, 
response competition results between the desire to categorize the stimulus as an insect 
and the desire to categorize the stimulus as something bad (see Brendl, Markman, & 
Messner, 2001).  The instantaneous (and uncontrolled) evaluation of the target 
stimulus leads to confusion, and therefore greater response latencies, when response 
options are incongruent. 
 
Given the widely accepted response competition mechanism by which the IAT works, 
it had been hypothesized that honest responses would have been facilitated when the 
response option (e.g., “yes”) was paired with “truth” and inhibited (via response 
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competition) when paired with “lie.”  Someone responding dishonestly, however, 
should experience the opposite pattern of response competition.  To understand why 
the present results were opposite to the typical IAT bias it is helpful to consider an 
example.  Imagine a participant who is dishonestly denying any history of illegal drug 
use.  When asked whether he or she has used an illegal drug (a yes-or-no trial) the 
correct response would be to press the “no” button, even though this particular 
response is a lie.  Similarly, when presented with a statement claiming that a cow is 
smaller than a fly the correct response would be to press the “lie” button, even though 
there might be a tendency to respond to the statement as though it were a question 
(i.e., “no, a cow is not smaller than a fly”).  If the participant is able to accurately and 
reliably distinguish question trials from statement trials then his or her dominant 
response (the one initially favored upon processing the target stimuli) is most likely to 
be correct, as was well established in the first two training blocks. 
 
However, after completing the computer task many participants reported considerable 
confusion in keeping the two categories of stimuli separate to avoid errors caused by 
labeling their responses to yes-or-no questions as the “truth” or a “lie” and answering 
truth-or-lie statements with a “yes” or a “no.”  How might this confusion influence 
response latencies?  If an inaccurate statement (a lie) is responded to as a question 
(“no”) than the response option used will result in an error at least half of the time.  
Similarly, if a yes-or-no question is mistaken for a stimulus that can be categorized as 
representing either the “truth” or a “lie” as a function of the dominant response’s 
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actual veracity (e.g., it is a lie to say that I have never used an illegal drug), again that 
confusion would lead to response errors. 
 
In the first block of test trials “yes” and “lie” were mapped to the left button while 
“no” and “truth” were mapped to the right.  In our example, imagine that the 
participant, who is falsely denying a history of illegal drug use, is reacting towards 
the left response option following the presentation of “Have you completely abstained 
from illegal drug use?”  One of two possibilities is likely: either (1) the stimulus was 
correctly processed and “yes” is the appropriate response (given their intent to 
deceive) or (2) the stimulus was incorrectly processed as representing a lie and that 
initial reaction towards the left response option is a result of “lie” being mapped to it. 
 
As the question on which the participant is knowingly lying was asked in a truth-
incongruent condition (the correct response is on the same button as “lie”), the latter 
is possible.  The initial reaction towards the left could have been due to the 
association with the stimulus’ veracity.  Given evidence of a possible 
miscategorization our participant may hesitate, if only for a moment, to confirm that 
the stimulus should in fact have been categorized as a yes-or-no question and that 
“yes” (rather than “lie”) is the appropriate answer.  However, in the second of the two 
test blocks, when the same question is asked in a truth-congruent condition, the 
presence of the word “truth” on the initially favored response option would indicate 
that there was no miscategorization.  Had the stimulus been mistakenly categorized as 
a “lie” then the initial reaction should have been towards the right, not the left.  In the 
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absence of any evidence that a miscategorization might have occurred the participant 
is free to commit to his or her initial response without further delay.  As a result, 
participants who are lying take longer to respond when “lie” is present on the correct 
response option, earning the negative bias score. 
 
For a participant who is truthfully answering the same question under the same 
conditions, the opposite pattern would emerge.  “Lie” being present on the favored 
response option in the first block of test trials would be evidence that the stimulus 
was not mistakenly categorized as representing the truth.  However, when asked again 
in the truth-congruent condition, there is now reason to second-guess the immediate 
reaction.  With truth-congruent and –incongruent trials balanced across the two 
testing blocks and reaction times standardized by block, the overall bias score 
indicates whether a participant was generally delayed by the presence of “truth” or 
“lie” on the appropriate response option.  
 
In sum, the present procedure is not a direct extension of implicit attitude 
measurement, and the results do not call into question the mechanism by which 
attitudes might be measured with the IAT.  Instead, the data suggests that this novel 
application of a dual-discrimination task yielded differences in reaction times via its 
own mechanism.  Any implicit benefit that congruent mapping might have in 
selecting the appropriate response button (as we see in an IAT) is overshadowed by 
the difficulty of the task and the inherent confusion created by the two categories of 
stimuli used.  The bias score calculated indicates on which of the trials participants 
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tended to hesitate and it is clear from the data that truthful participants are slower 
when their response to a yes-or-no question is asked in a truth-congruent condition 
while dishonest participants are slower responding in a truth-incongruent condition.  
The relative complexity of processing entire sentences (rather than individual words 
or images), combined with the difficulty of keeping separate factual claims from 
judgments of veracity, leads congruent response options to signal a potential error in 
the initial categorization of the stimulus.  As a result, participants’ awareness of the 
veracity of their answer, combined with the concern for making as few errors as 
possible, provided the analysis procedure with a means by which to distinguish 
genuine and deceitful responses to forced-choice questioning. 
 
Had no significant differences been found between those lying and those telling the 
truth it would have made sense to abandon the present procedure in favor of some 
variation that might produce the predicted IAT response competition pattern.  
However, given that there is clearly some other mechanism underlying the present 








Data from the first experiment suggests that a dual-discrimination procedure is 
capable of detecting a bias helpful in differentiating honest from dishonest reports of 
illegal drug use history.  Although the results cannot be attributed to individual 
differences in actual drug use, it was nonetheless desirable to replicate the experiment 
with a different target question.  Ideally the procedure would produce equally 
significant predictions, and more importantly, make its predictions based on the same 
pattern of differences observed in Experiment 1.  Demonstrating reliability across 
questioning topics strengthens our conceptual understanding of how the procedure 
works to detect deception and testifies to its issue-independent nature. 
 
An important feature of Experiment 1 is that the number of participants who reported 
some history of illegal drug use on the initial survey was roughly equal to those who 
had actually abstained.  As a result of the subsequent assignment to give a particular 
response, each of the four participant conditions had approximately the same number 
of participants.  Whereas this was a desirable feature for the first experiment, there 
are likely to be applications where the distribution of participants into the various 
conditions would be more skewed.  For example, in a national security clearance 
context, everyone would presumably deny any impropriety.  However, only a small 
percentage (if any) of the individuals screened would actually be guilty of something 
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worth concealing.  Thus, it would be informative to test the procedure with a topic on 
which we would expect to find a more skewed distribution in the actual history of the 





Experiment 2 followed the same procedure as Experiment 1 but substituted illegal file 
downloading for drug use. Following the anonymous survey participants were 
randomly assigned to either admit to or deny some history of illegal file downloading, 
explicitly defined as obtaining any copyrighted media or software without paying the 
copyright owner for it.  The four target questions asked whether the individual has 
engaged in (or abstained from) illegal downloading and whether the individual was 
responding honestly (or dishonestly) about his or her history of illegal file  
downloading.  Again they were questioned orally by the experimenter and then 
instructed to complete the computerized deception detection procedure by responding 
as quickly and as accurately as possible.  The number of trials and the sequence of the 










Data were collected from 100 male and female undergrads participants who were 
instructed to either admit or deny ever having illegally downloaded files.  Seven (7%) 
of those participants were ultimately excluded for having error rates over 20%, and of 
the remaining 93 all but five (94.6%) reported illegal downloading at least once in 
their lives.  All five of the participants who had reported having never downloaded 
illegally happened to be randomly assigned to deny downloading, and thus no 
participants were instructed to dishonestly admit having downloaded illegally.  
However, there were still an equal number of participants responding honestly and 
dishonestly, so the chance of predicting the veracity of their answers remained at 
50%. 
 
Latencies were again transformed to Z-scores for each participant and by each block 
of trials to control for individual differences and order effects.  A difference score for 
each of the four target questions was computed and then summed to compute the 
overall bias score. 
 
Because there were an unequal number of participants in the four conditions, average 
bias scores were collapsed into two groups, one for those who were responding 
honestly and the other for those who were responding dishonestly (see Figure 2).  As 
in Experiment 1, there were no differences in overall reaction time, t(91) = 1.37, p < 
.05) and participants who were responding honestly earned, on average, a positive 
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bias score (M = .162, SD = .737) while 
those responding dishonestly averaged a 
negative bias score (M = -.130, SD = .749), 
t(91) = -2.04, p < .05.  The logistic 
regression correctly predicted the veracity 
of a participant’s response 58.1% of the 
time, !2(1) = 4.188, p < .05.  Again 
subsequent analyses failed to find any 





Experiment 2 succeeded in replicating the earlier finding that participants responding 
honestly were generally faster on truth-incongruent trials while those responding 
deceptively were faster on truth-congruent trials.  It is worth noting that, consistent 
with results from Experiment 1, providing counterfactual responses was not 
associated with greater overall latencies.  The average gain of about 7% in accuracy 
across the two studies indicates there is room for future research to explore variations 
of the present design that might maximize predictions.  However, from a theoretical 
standpoint the first two studies demonstrate conclusively that there are implicit 
associations between responses to forced-choice questioning and their veracity and 
that the influence of those associations can be measured with a dual-discrimination 




task.  Before concern over the prediction accuracy drives empirical testing of the 
variants it is desirable to first identify some of the methodological constraints that 
govern the general effect. 
 
It is also worth noting that nearly 95% of the participants admitted to having engaged 
in illegal activity.  Aside from what this indicates about the prevalence of copyright 
infringement among college students, these results give further confidence that 
participants are responding honestly on the initial surveys used to assess the true state 
of affairs in Experiment 1 and 2.  It would appear that the anonymous conditions in 
which the data were collected succeeded in making participants feel comfortable with 









The goal of Experiment 3 was to test a variant of the procedure from Experiment 1 in 
which truth-congruence was randomized on a trial-by-trial basis rather than by block.  
It is conceivable that someone well informed of the analysis procedure could 
selectively delay responses in such a way as to mimic the profile characteristics 
typical of an honest participant.  As the average latencies calculated in Experiments 1 
and 2 are based on trials within a single block the strategic pauses required are 
predictable and rehearsable even if the order of blocks is randomized.   
 
Obviously the ability to be reliably categorized as honest would be the most desirable 
outcome for anyone attempting to countermeasure the procedure.  However, if the 
configurations vary randomly between trials and are presented only a moment before 
the stimuli it would be considerably more difficult to appropriately delay specific 
responses based on the target stimulus and the specific configuration.  Of course the 
additional task demand poses the risk of adding more variability in the latency data 
and delaying responses across the board, thereby obscuring relative differences 
between truth-congruent and –incongruent trials.  Nonetheless it is worth exploring 
whether this variant can produce predictions similar to those generated in the first two 







Generally speaking the procedure was a replication of Experiment 1 with three 
specific modifications.  First, an additional training block followed the first two in 
order to establish the dual-discrimination task with fixed response option  
configurations before they varied between trials.  Second, as all possible response 
option configurations occurred equally in each of the two testing blocks no re-
mapping block was required in between them.  Lastly, after each trial the response 
options disappeared from the screen for the 1500ms ITI and then appeared, in another 
randomly determined configuration, 500ms before the target stimulus was presented.  
The order in which stimuli and screen configurations occurred was randomized for 
each participant and fully balanced in each of the two test blocks.  Timing of the 
stimulus presentation, feedback, speed prompt and limit were the same as those in the 




Data were collected from 113 male and female undergraduate participants who, as in 
Experiment 1, were instructed to either admit to or deny illegal drug use.  Twenty-
four (21%) of those participants were ultimately excluded for having error rates over 




Again responses were converted to Z-scores within each of the two test blocks and 
then combined to form the composite bias score between truth-congruent and –
incongruent conditions. As depicted in Figure 3, participants responding honestly (M 
= .005, SD = .736) tended to exhibit a slightly more positive bias score than those 
responding dishonestly (M = -.108, SD = .844).  However, given such large standard 
errors, an ANOVA found no effect for 
veracity, F(1,85) = .247, p > .05.  
Collapsing bias scores into groups 
representing those lying and those 
telling the truth, a logistic regression 
was correct 53.9%, which is not 
significantly different than what 





Based on data from Experiment 3 it appears that the additional task demands created 
by randomly varying response options negates the procedure’s ability to detect 
meaningful differences between truthful and deceitful participants.  Indeed 
participants often commented on finding the procedure difficult and frustrating and 
the number of participants excluded for failing to achieve the minimum accuracy rate 
was triple of that in the first two experiments.  Had the variant succeeded in 
Fig. 3 Bias Scores From Exp 3 
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producing significant predictions, the revised procedure might offer greater resistance 
to the selective manipulation of reaction times.  However, given the inflated standard 
errors and a marked decrease in accuracy rates, the data suggests that a between-trial 
manipulations of response option configurations requires processing demands beyond 
what is appropriate for this type of reaction time paradigm.  The remaining 









Perhaps the most simple and intuitive way to circumvent the detection procedure 
would be to delay all of one’s reactions to a constant integer within the 3000ms 
response window and then answer correctly.  Doing so would achieve the necessary 
accuracy rate while masking any differences in actual processing time as a function of 
truth-congruence.  Further, even those without any detailed knowledge of the analysis 
procedure would be able to understand what the countermeasure strategy requires of 
them.  However, given findings on the difficulty of manipulating response latencies in 
a dual-discrimination task, it is reasonable to hypothesize that participants will not be 
successful in reliably conforming their reaction times to sufficiently negate 
differences as a function of truth-congruence on their first exposure to the procedure.  
Successful predictions despite deliberate efforts to control latencies would expand on 





Experiment 4 was an exact replication of Experiment 1 with the addition of 
instructions to avoid detection by holding all response times to a constant.  After 
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being surveyed about their actual history of illegal drug use but prior to beginning the 
computer task the researcher gave the following instructions:  
In previous studies we have told participants that their task is to convince me, 
and the lie detector, that they are telling the truth by responding to questions 
as quickly as they possibly can. However, I am going to give you information 
they did not have on how to defeat the test, and it is important that you listen 
carefully to how you can fool the computer and that you try your best to 
successfully use this strategy. 
 
The computer will not be able to determine if you are responding honestly or 
dishonestly if all your reaction times are the same.  Therefore, rather than 
going as fast as you possibly can, your goal is take the same amount of time 
on every trial while still giving the correct answer.  After the first set of 
practice trials the computer will require you to answer a question by pressing 
a button within 3 seconds.  After 3 seconds the trial counts as an incorrect 
response. 
 
Your goal is to take the same amount of time on every trial without getting cut 
off by the computer.  So, for example, if you take exactly 2 ! seconds to 
respond on every single trial, you’ll have beaten the test.  Do your best to 
answer all of the questions correctly and in the same exact amount of time.  
Do you understand what you have to do to beat the test? 
 
Following the computer task participants were given a survey on which they were 
asked to rate on a seven-point scale how easy (1) or difficult (7) they found it to 






Data were collected from 130 male and female undergraduate participants who, as in 
Experiment 1 and 3, were instructed to either admit to or deny illegal drug use.  Ten 
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(7.7%) of those participants were excluded for having error rates over 20%, and the 
remaining 120 earned an average accuracy rate of 94% regardless of whether they 
were responding honestly or deceptively.  With fifty-nine participants responding 
honestly and sixty-one deceptively, labeling all as deceptive would be correct 50.8% 
of the time. 
 
Responses were again converted to Z-scores within each of the two test blocks and 
then combined to form the composite bias score between truth-congruent and –
incongruent conditions.  As depicted in Figure 4, those honestly denying any history 
of illegal drug use tended to earn a negative bias score (M = -.266, SD = .667), 
though none of four averages differed significantly from each other or from zero.  An 
ANOVA confirmed there was no main 
effects for response veracity, F(1,116) = 
.095, p < .05, nor was there an effect 
of the specific claim (used or 
abstained) or an interaction between 
the two, F(1,116) = .229 and F(1,116) = 
1.06 respectively, p’s > .05. 
 
Collapsing bias scores into groups representing those lying and those telling the truth, 
a logistic regression was correct 47.5% of the time, which is worse (though not 
significantly) than what chance might predict, !2(1) = .022, p > .05.  Honest (M = 
5.05, SD = 1.33) and dishonest (M = 4.89, SD = 1.41) participants found it equally 
Fig. 4 Bias Scores From Exp 4 
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difficult to hold responses to a constant latency, F(1,116) = .825 and there was no effect 
of claim nor an interaction between claim and veracity, F(1,116) = 1.22 and F(1,116) = 





Results from Experiment 4 indicate that providing participants with instructions to 
delay responses to a constant latency interfered with the procedures ability to detect 
any meaningful differences in reaction time profiles.  This certainly calls into 
question the applicability of the present approach to deception detection in contexts 
where individuals might be motivated to avoid detection and informed of strategies 
for doing so.  However, the ease with which the procedure might be countermeasured 
by attempts to delay responses does not negate the theoretical contribution of the 
earlier findings.  Instead it calls for a variation of the procedure in which average 
latencies and the variability between trials and between subjects can be reduced.  
Such a variation may not only benefit the prediction accuracy or the procedure but 
may also, in turn, make it considerably more difficult to deliberately delay latencies. 
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The final study was designed to explore another variation of the procedure in which 
target stimuli are presented in a more simple way.  By reducing the trigger stimuli to 
a single word (rather than a complete sentence) participants should be able to respond 
more rapidly and with less variability than in Experiments 1 and 2.  An overall 
reduction in variability may prove useful in increasing the accuracy of the predictions 
generated by the procedure.  More importantly, this variant of the original is more 
similar in design to the IAT. 
 
The earlier experiments used entire sentences because doing so seemed to guarantee 
that participants would have to process the full meaning of the stimulus in order to 
respond correctly.  It was desirable that while responding to a question the 
implications of the given response (i.e., its veracity) be salient.  However, by 
segmenting the stimuli into two successive presentations Experiment 5 aimed to test a 
more IAT-like design while maintaining the impact of having to respond to 
meaningful questions.  Further, reducing the response window might increase the 
difficulty of defeating the procedure by delaying responses either selectively or across 
all trials.  There would be less time available to pause before being cut off, and the 
shorter window would require even greater control over a smaller amount of time to 






The procedure followed that of the first experiment with regards to the instructions 
given and the arrangement of the training and test blocks.  The presentation sequence, 
however, was broken into two parts.  Following the standard 1500 ITI, the first part of 
a yes-or-no question, or truth-or-lie statement, would appear on the screen for 
1500ms.  For example, the first line might read, “Have you abstained from:” on a yes-
or-no question trial or “A cow is bigger than:” on a truth-or-lie statement trial.  The 
target word that completes the question or statement (e.g., “drugs” or “water”) would 
then appear on the second line and participants would have only 1500ms (rather than 
the 3000ms) to respond. 
 
It was hypothesized was that the results would mirror those of the first two 
experiments in the direction of the bias score.  Another possibility, however, is that 
making the procedure more similar to the IAT would, in turn, make the pattern of 
results more consistent with the typical effect of congruence in a dual-discrimination 
task.  This would be the case if truthful participants earn negative bias scores by 








Data were collected from 128 male and female undergraduate participants who were 
instructed to either admit to or deny illegal drug use.  Nine (7.0%) of those 
participants were excluded for having error rates over 20%, and the remaining 119 
earned an average accuracy rate of 92% regardless of whether they were responding 
honestly or deceptively.  With fifty-eight participants responding honestly and sixty-
one deceptively, labeling all as deceptive would be correct 51.3% of the time. 
 
Responses were again converted to Z-
scores within each of the two test 
blocks and then combined to form the 
composite bias score between truth-
congruent and –incongruent 
conditions.  As depicted in Figure 5 
there were no significant main effects 
for veracity, F(1,115) = .335, p > .05, or 
claim F(1,115) = .040, p > .05, nor was there an interaction between the two, F(1,115) = 
.607, p > .05. 
 
Collapsing bias scores into groups representing those lying and those telling the truth, 
a logistic regression was correct 50.4% of the time, which is not significantly 
different than what chance might predict, !2(1) = .336, p > .05. 







It appears that the IAT-like variant tested in Experiment 5 is not a viable substitute or 
replacement for the original design of the procedure.  Modifying the procedure to 
utilize a single word as the trigger stimulus failed to produce any meaningful 
differences between participant conditions or predictions of response veracity.  
Perhaps the meaning of the sentence is lost in separating the stimulus into two parts 
and cognitive processing of the target word is limited to conditioned response 
strategies (e.g., if I see the words “drugs” next I’ll press the left button, if I see the 
word “water” next I’ll press the right button).  It is also possible that the same 
concern over miscategorization errors that apparently led to the success of the original 
procedure in the first two experiments occurred but was sufficiently resolved in the 
1500ms between the presentations of the first part of the sentence and the trigger 
stimulus.  In anticipating the possible ways in which a yes-or-no question stimulus 
could be completed participants may have become aware of the potential confusion 
and confirmed the stimulus category (question or statement) prior to the target word 
appearing.  However, a review of the reports completed by researchers did not turn up 
any comments made by participants in Experiment 5 that would indicate they found it 
any easier than those in the earlier studies.  Regardless, it seems clear that future 
exploration of dual-categorization tasks in deception detection contexts should build 
upon the original design in which complete sentences are used as target stimuli. 
 40 
 
Chapter VII:  General Discussion 
 
The present findings offer support for the idea that biographical information is 
cognitively represented such that what is known to be true or false is implicitly 
associated with one’s general concepts of “truth” and “lie” respectively.  Thus, the 
cognitive organization that enables one to selectively offer deceptive responses also 
provides a means by which to detect the deceptive intent.  Taken together the project 
demonstrates that an existing dual-discrimination task such as the IAT can be adapted 
to assess the veracity of responses to forced-choice questioning.  More notably the 
results from Experiments 1 and 2 provide consistent evidence that such an adaptation 
produces a pattern of bias scores opposite in direction to that of a traditional IAT.  
The most cogent account of the obtained results is that the judgments required to 
navigate the task create an inherent source of confusion, and therefore response 
apprehension, on veracity-congruent trials (truth-congruent for truthful respondents 
and truth-incongruent for deceptive respondents).  The response apprehension pattern 
is expressed in the composite bias score, reflecting the relative speed with which 
participants react in truth-congruent and –incongruent response conditions. 
 
It is impossible to study deception detection without considering the potential applied 
value of a novel theoretical and methodological approach.  The marginal gain in 
prediction accuracy, combined with the procedure’s failure to maintain those 
predictions in the face of deliberate latency manipulation in Experiment 4, casts 
serious doubt on whether this approach will ever be viable in an “applied” context.  
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However, the present procedure’s limitations as a functional lie detector do not 
detract from its conceptual contribution to the science of deception detection.  In 
addition to demonstrating that deception can be detected by the implicit association 
between one’s representation of the concept “lie” and the actual lie itself, some of the 
methodological constraints of this approach have also been identified. 
 
One important question addressed was whether manipulating the response conditions 
between-trials would intensify the underlying response apprehension (and thereby 
polarizing bias scores) or negate its effect by introducing additional variance to the 
latencies.  Based on Experiment 3 it is evident that such a dynamic cognitive task, 
combined with the complexity of the stimuli, is not reasonable for a reaction time 
measurement procedure.  With triple the error rates and double the variance, any 
differences that might have existed between response conditions would have been 
obscured out by the noise.  Any future variation of the procedure should clearly 
maintain the between-block manipulation of truth-congruence and focus on reducing 
variance in the latency profiles.  However, results from Experiment 5 suggest that 
simply reducing the trigger stimulus to a single word, as in a traditional IAT, is not 
the appropriate way to minimize error variance.   
 
It may be that the future application of this new development is not as a stand-alone 
detection system, but rather as a technique to integrate with existing technologies.  
For example, physiological data traditionally collected during a polygraph, or perhaps 
even facial cues (Ekman et al., 1998), may provide evidence (beyond a relative delay 
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in reaction time) of stress when responding under veracity-congruent conditions.  
Further, the cognitive demands of the procedure may interfere with self-presentation 
efforts to conceal some of these physiological and nonverbal indicators, thereby 
providing a multiplicative effect on existing measures.  Eye gaze (e.g., Yarbus, 1967) 
during the task may offer an additional indication of deceptive responding if the 
present account for the obtained pattern is correct.  Response apprehension, triggered 
by veracity-congruent trials, should be marked by greater back and forth movement 
between the stimulus and a response option before the corresponding button is 
pressed.  As research continues to develop our understanding of the underlying 
process involved, advancements to the methodology may one day redeem the applied 






Question orally asked by the researcher prior to the testing procedure and the 






Is it your intention to answer all of my questions honestly? “Yes” 
Have you ever in your life drunk water? “Yes” 
Have you completely abstained from drinking water? “No” 
Have you ever used a drug that is currently illegal in the United 
States? 
“No” “Yes” 
Have you completely abstained from illegal drug use? “Yes” “No” 
Are you telling the truth about your history of illegal drug use? “Yes” 






Experiment 1 Trial Sequence 
 










Have you ever used an illegal drug? 
Have you abstained from illegal drug use? 
Are you telling the truth about your drug use? 
Are you being dishonest about your drug use? 
Have you ever drunk water? 










True statements – for example: 
• “There are 26 letters in the English alphabet.” 
• “You are on a college campus right now.” 
• “A fly is smaller than a cow.” 
False statements – for example: 
• “There are 62 letters in the English alphabet.” 
• “You are on a bus right now.” 
• “A cow is smaller than a fly.” 
LIE TRUTH 
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Have you ever used an illegal drug? 
Have you abstained from illegal drug use? 
Are you being honest about your drug use? 
Are you being dishonest about your drug use? 
Have you ever drunk water? 




























Have you ever used an illegal drug? 
Have you abstained from illegal drug use? 
Are you being honest about your drug use? 
Are you being dishonest about your drug use? 
Have you ever drunk water? 
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